Industrial Climate Strategies in Transition: Why CO₂-Low Aluminium Is Becoming a Strategic Commodity
While the European Union seeks to balance the goals of climate neutrality with the preservation of industrial competitiveness, one material is increasingly gaining strategic importance: aluminium – more specifically, CO₂-low aluminium. The targeted import of this energy-intensive metal, produced in a sustainable manner, could become a cornerstone of the new European industrial and trade policy.
Aluminium is indispensable in modern industrial processes – whether in the automotive and aerospace industries, electronics, construction, or packaging. At the same time, it is one of the most emissions-intensive raw materials. Worldwide, the production of one tonne of primary aluminium on average causes around 11 tonnes of CO₂ equivalents, while in the EU it is about 6.7 tonnes. A large portion of these emissions comes from the electricity consumption in the smelting processes – and thus from the respective energy source.
The differences between production locations are significant: in countries such as Canada, Norway, or Iceland, where hydropower dominates the energy mix, CO₂ emissions in aluminium production are below two tonnes per tonne of aluminium – in some cases even lower. Even in the United Arab Emirates, aluminium manufacturers are increasingly relying on solar energy, creating new capacities for the international market of green materials.
This production advantage is becoming a decisive competitive factor. With the full implementation of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2026, energy-intensive imports such as aluminium will be subject to stricter emissions reporting requirements and CO₂ pricing. At the same time, the European Commission is considering introducing green procurement quotas and price premiums to specifically promote the market for CO₂-low materials. Already today, certified aluminium products with a low CO₂ footprint command significant premiums – between €100 and €300 per tonne, depending on certification and buyer.
Economically, too, there is much to be said for a strategic opening towards CO₂-low aluminium producers. With electricity prices sometimes exceeding €100/MWh, aluminium production in Europe is becoming increasingly unprofitable. In contrast, manufacturers in Canada or Norway benefit from stable, low-emission energy at about a third of the cost. Currently, the EU imports around 70% of its primary aluminium requirements – according to the International Aluminium Institute, this share could rise to over 80% by 2030, provided access to reliable, climate-friendly supply chains is politically secured.
In this context, the world’s largest producer of CO₂-low aluminium deserves a differentiated look – Rusal. Despite the geopolitically concerning situation resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that the majority of Rusal’s production is based on hydropower plants in Siberia and generates on average only about 2.3 tonnes of CO₂ per tonne of aluminium – placing Rusal on a comparable level with Scandinavian manufacturers and well below the global average.
This raises an uncomfortable but unavoidable industrial policy question: Is it justifiable – or even necessary – to consider CO₂-low aluminium from Russia, if it can significantly contribute to the decarbonisation of European value chains? Especially when alternative supplies are not yet available in sufficient quantities?
Several EU member states, including France and Italy, have already signalled that they want to distinguish between political and product-related considerations. Industry insiders report that large European buyers – including car manufacturers – are considering whether CO₂-low aluminium from Russia can still be sourced via third countries or under certain conditions.
This development shows that the debate about CO₂-low materials is no longer limited to technology and certification – it increasingly touches upon issues of geopolitics, ethics, and strategic considerations. In a world of multiple crises and competing objectives – climate protection, supply security, values-based trade – raw material policy is becoming realpolitik. The crucial issue is not just where a product comes from, but under what conditions and within which regulatory framework it is produced and traded.
Meanwhile, international tensions are continuing to escalate: at the beginning of 2025, the United States raised their tariffs on aluminium imports to 50% in order to protect domestic industry. The EU responded with quota regulations and a tightening of CBAM provisions. However, the pressure on European manufacturers remains. Recent market data shows that the price of conventional aluminium is about $2,350 per tonne on the London Metal Exchange, while certified CO₂-low aluminium commands prices up to $2,650 – a premium that many buyers are willing to pay in order to improve their climate balance.
The geopolitical and industrial policy implications are clear: CO₂-low aluminium is becoming a strategic raw material for the European climate strategy. Through targeted trade agreements with countries that offer climate-friendly production conditions – such as Norway, Canada, Iceland, or the United Arab Emirates – the EU could both accelerate its climate goals and strengthen supply security for key industrial materials. Proposals for a “Green Aluminium Partnership” between Europe and leading CO₂-low producers are already on the table – but realistically, Russia will remain part of the strategic equation.
This creates new room for manoeuvre for European industry: companies that buy CO₂-low materials early and integrate them into climate-neutral value chains not only secure competitive advantages but also a leadership role in global climate protection. CO₂-low aluminium is no longer a niche product for sustainability reports – it is becoming a fundamental component of strategic industrial policy. Europe would do well to approach this component with clarity, realism, and foresight.
